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Abstract  23 
Background 24 
A range of policy initiatives have addressed inequalities in healthcare and health 25 
outcomes.  Local pay-for-performance schemes for primary care have been 26 
advocated as means of enhancing clinical ownership of the quality agenda and 27 
better targeting local need compared with national schemes such as the UK Quality 28 
and Outcomes Framework (QOF).  We investigated whether professionals’ 29 
experience of a local scheme in one English National Health Service (NHS) former 30 
primary care trust (PCT) differed from that of the national QOF in relation to the goal 31 
of reducing inequalities. 32 
Methods 33 
We conducted retrospective semi-structured interviews with primary care 34 
professionals implementing the scheme and those involved in its development.  We 35 
purposively sampled practices with varying levels of population socio-economic 36 
deprivation and achievement.  Interviews explored perceptions of the scheme and 37 
indicators, likely mechanisms of influence on practice, perceived benefits and harms, 38 
and how future schemes could be improved.  We used a framework approach to 39 
analysis. 40 
Results 41 
Thirty-eight professionals from 16 general practices and six professionals involved in 42 
developing local indicators participated.  Our findings cover four themes: ownership, 43 
credibility of the indicators, influences on behaviour, and exacerbated tensions.  We 44 
found little evidence that the scheme engendered any distinctive sense of ownership 45 
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or experiences different from the national scheme.  Although the indicators and their 46 
evidence base were seldom actively questioned, doubts were expressed about their 47 
focus on health promotion given that eventual benefits relied upon patient action and 48 
availability of local resources.  Whilst practices serving more affluent populations 49 
reported status and patient benefit as motivators for participating in the scheme, 50 
those serving more deprived populations highlighted financial reward.  The scheme 51 
exacerbated tensions between patient and professional consultation agendas, 52 
general practitioners benefitting directly from incentives and nurses who did much of 53 
the work, and practices serving more and less affluent populations which faced 54 
different challenges in achieving targets. 55 
Conclusions 56 
The contentious nature of pay-for-performance was not necessarily reduced by local 57 
adaptation.  Those developing future schemes should consider differential rewards 58 
and supportive resources for practices serving more deprived populations, and 59 
employing a wider range of levers to promote professional understanding and 60 
ownership of indicators. 61 
 62 
Keywords: primary health care; pay-for-performance; financial incentives; social 63 
deprivation  64 
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Background 65 
Evidence is accumulating that the establishment in 2004 of the Quality and 66 
Outcomes Framework (QOF) as a pay-for-performance scheme for UK primary care 67 
has not fulfilled all hopes and expectations [1].  Not only is there a problematic 68 
evidence base [2], but its effects appear mixed [3] with persistent variations in the 69 
quality of primary care [4] and concerns that QOF may have undermined 70 
professionals’ intrinsic motivation, patient-centeredness, and continuity of care [3, 5-71 
9].  Professionals are reluctant to engage in quality improvement initiatives perceived 72 
as ineffective or even harmful [10], including pay-for-performance schemes 73 
misaligned with professional values [1, 6, 11-13].  The Darzi Review of quality 74 
improvement in the National Health Service (NHS) placed much emphasis on 75 
engaging professionals [14].  At a local level, active involvement of professionals is 76 
presumed essential in promoting ownership, providing that perceived benefits of 77 
change compensate for the effort required [15-17].  At face value, the establishment 78 
of pay-for-performance schemes with locally negotiated indicators offered 79 
advantages over the national scheme, as means of promoting clinical ownership by 80 
addressing local health priorities and enhancing the effects of incentives [18]. 81 
We evaluated a scheme in one former PCT which was particularly motivated by the 82 
need to address inequalities in healthcare provision and outcomes.  The scheme ran 83 
over 2007-11 at a cost of £3 million, and targeted five health priorities: alcohol; 84 
learning disabilities; chlamydia; obesity; and osteoporosis (Table 1).  The selection of 85 
priorities, indicators and payment thresholds were negotiated between the PCT and 86 
local health care providers, approved by the Local Medical Committee, and reviewed 87 
and refined over the lifetime of the scheme.  Our accompanying paper provides more 88 
detailed information  about the indicators [19].  We found that gaps in achievement 89 
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between practices serving less and more deprived patients were modest during the 90 
first year of the scheme and closed over time for one and widened for one of the 16 91 
indicators and possibly two other indicators.  In addition, larger practices and those 92 
serving more affluent areas earned more income per patient than smaller practices 93 
and those serving more deprived areas. 94 
These mixed findings somewhat contrasted with longitudinal analyses of the national 95 
QOF which indicated that initial gaps in achievement between practices in deprived 96 
and affluent areas these closed over time [20].  It was disappointing that a local 97 
initiative intended to overcome the disadvantages of the national scheme did not 98 
reduce inequalities as intended, 99 
We undertook a qualitative study, in parallel to our above quantitative analysis, to 100 
explore primary care professionals’ experience of the local QOF, including 101 
perceptions of the scheme and indicators, likely mechanisms of influence on 102 
practice, and perceived benefits and harms.  We investigated whether professionals’ 103 
experience of the local QOF did differ from that of the national QOF in relation to the 104 
goal of reducing inequalities. 105 
 106 
Methods 107 
Design and setting 108 
We undertook a retrospective semi-structured interview study within NHS Bradford 109 
and Airedale, of its local pay-for-performance scheme.  110 
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Participants 111 
We initially invited managers from all 83 practices to nominate themselves and other 112 
practice staff to participate in interviews.  We then purposively selected practices 113 
according to practice population socio-economic profiles (deprived or not) and local 114 
QOF achievement (high or low achievement).  We then used snowballing to further 115 
recruit participants through asking those interviewed to nominate additional practices 116 
or participants.  We also invited six PCT and practice professionals involved in 117 
developing the scheme.   118 
Data collection and analysis 119 
Following consent, a social scientist researcher (JH) conducted face-to-face 120 
interviews at venues of participants’ choice (usually at work) over August 2011 to 121 
June 2012.  We reimbursed participants for their time and advised them that 122 
responses would be treated confidentially.  Interviews explored whether perceptions 123 
of the indicators, mechanisms by which it influenced practice, benefits and harms, 124 
and how future iterations of such schemes could be improved (Topic guide, 125 
Appendix 1). 126 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim.  Transcripts were 127 
anonymised and checked for accuracy.  We used NVivo 8 to manage interview data 128 
and a thematic framework approach to analysis [21].  Five transcripts were double 129 
coded by (JH, LG and RF) and a coding schedule was developed (Appendix 2).  JH 130 
coded the remainder of the transcripts.  Data were initially coded deductively to 131 
areas pre-specified in the topic guide; further codes emerged from the data 132 
inductively.  Codes were grouped to form overarching themes which were iteratively 133 
refined over the course of analysis.  Recruitment and interviews continued until no 134 
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new codes had emerged.  We compared and contrasted accounts from high and low 135 
deprivation and high and low achieving practices, and sought discrepant accounts. 136 
Ethical review 137 
The study was approved by National Research Ethics Service East Midlands- 138 
Nottingham 2 Committee (11/EM/0184). 139 
 140 
Results 141 
We interviewed 44 professionals involved in developing or implementing the local 142 
scheme.  Primary care staff from 16 practices participated in the interviews, eight of 143 
these practices having been identified through snowballing.  Eight practices served 144 
relatively socio-economically deprived populations and 12 had relatively high local 145 
QOF achievement (Table 2).  Of the 38 practice staff interviewed, there were 15 146 
practice managers, 10 GP partners, two salaried GPs, and 11 practice nurses.  The 147 
six additional participants who had been involved in developing the scheme 148 
comprised four PCT managers, one salaried GP, and one practice nurse.  Thirty-149 
three participants were female and 24 worked full-time.  Median interview length was 150 
44 minutes (range 18 to 88 minutes).   151 
We report our findings in four overarching themes: credibility of the locally negotiated 152 
indicators; ownership; influences on behaviour; and exacerbated tensions.  Where 153 
evident, we compare and contrast findings according to participants’ practice 154 
population socioeconomic status and achievement, and involvement in scheme 155 
development.   156 
 157 
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Credibility of the indicators 158 
The local scheme developers had sought to target locally relevant and, largely, 159 
public health issues absent from the national QOF.  Professionals perceived the 160 
limited evidence base underpinning such indicators as less of an issue than practical 161 
considerations around their implementation.  Hence, the evidence base was often 162 
taken at face value, especially by practice nurses: 163 
‘We appreciate that it is evidence based, obviously we wouldn’t be been 164 
asked to do anything that wasn’t.’  (P11, practice nurse, high performer, 165 
affluent area)     166 
‘I don’t know if I was told about the evidence, we should say, “What’s the 167 
evidence behind this?” but we’re too busy.’ (P37, practice nurse, high 168 
performer, deprived area) 169 
Professionals appeared more preoccupied by their lack of control in achieving 170 
indicator targets, especially if dependent upon patient cooperation: 171 
‘I can see why the alcohol and obesity were thought of as important, I get 172 
the clinical reason but I’m not sure that it worked in the real world.  People 173 
thought we’d get them in and we’d do this, but the fact is that they don’t 174 
come in and you don’t capture them and so it doesn’t work.’ (P19, practice 175 
manager, high performer, affluent area) 176 
Limited availability of appropriate, supportive resources needed to address such 177 
problems further undermined confidence in these targets. 178 
‘We’ve got a smoking cessation advisor within the practice, but there isn’t 179 
something with alcohol, and you wouldn’t refer to the alcohol and drugs 180 
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services unless someone’s quite bad.’ (P12, salaried GP, high performer, 181 
affluent area) 182 
There was a range of opinion about relevance to local need, with the indicators being 183 
seen as more salient to relatively deprived populations. 184 
“It was certainly developed based on looking at measureable things that 185 
were relevant to our population.’ (P36, GP partner, low performer, 186 
deprived area) 187 
In contrast, professionals from practices in affluent areas questioned the value of 188 
certain indicators to their population.   189 
‘The alcohol one for example for us is almost a bit of a waste of time, 190 
because our patients don’t fall into that category.’ (P11, practice nurse, 191 
high performer, affluent area) 192 
 193 
Ownership 194 
No clear sense emerged that the local pay-for-performance scheme was particularly 195 
distinctive and offered anything over and above the existing national QOF.  This was 196 
partly because the scheme actually addressed national priorities. 197 
‘We know too many people are overweight so in that sense it was targeted 198 
at areas where we had a particular problem…I’m not aware that we had a 199 
specific problem with osteoporosis in Bradford, likewise with learning 200 
disabilities, I don’t think we’ve got any more of an issue than other areas.  201 
There may have been other Bradford specific issues that we could have 202 
included which we didn’t...I think most GPs probably viewed it as just 203 
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another incentive scheme, and didn’t really think of it as bespoke.’  (P6, 204 
scheme developer) 205 
Ultimately then, practices tended not to differentiate between national and local 206 
schemes, especially high performers. 207 
‘It makes me feel no different, it’s just all part of my job, whether it’s a local 208 
thing or national, it makes no difference.’ (P19, practice manager, high 209 
performer, affluent area) 210 
One practice manager in a low performing practice went further in stating that the 211 
national scheme was more important. 212 
‘We were always aware it (the local scheme) was there but we didn’t feel it 213 
was as important as the (national) QOF.’ (P39, practice manager, low 214 
performer, affluent area) 215 
Participants implicitly defined ‘local’ in different ways, including at the practice, 216 
cluster of practices, and PCT levels. 217 
‘I think smaller cluster groups, because generally you’ll have an area such 218 
as ourselves here with about twelve surgeries where we’ve all got similar 219 
problems, so I think it would have helped if practices were grouped rather 220 
than it being a generic local QOF.’ (P14, practice manager, low performer, 221 
deprived area) 222 
There was a further suggestion that ‘buy-in’ might be greater if the identification of at 223 
least a limited number of priorities were delegated to practice level. 224 
‘From the start you’d be making them own it because you’d be saying 225 
“right, here’s a bit of money, you tell us how you want to spend it as a 226 
practice to improve quality of your patients”, so you’ve got the ownership 227 
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immediately because they’ve come up with the marker.’ (P10, practice 228 
manager, high performer, affluent area) 229 
Some participants expressed views that initial dissemination was insufficient and a 230 
familiarisation period would have helped embed targeted behaviours. 231 
‘If we’d been told a bit more we might have been more engaged.’ (P23, 232 
practice nurse, high performer, affluent area) 233 
‘If we had time to play about with it and start to monitor our own performance 234 
that would be really useful.’ (P10, practice manager, high performer, affluent 235 
area) 236 
 237 
Influences on behaviour 238 
The scheme seemed to influence adherence to the targets primarily through 239 
motivational means, supported by other mechanisms.  Motivations were extrinsically 240 
and intrinsically driven. 241 
Professionals from practices serving both affluent and deprived populations felt the 242 
scheme legitimised their intrinsic motivation to improve patient outcomes.   243 
‘It’s a massive motivation to know that the patients out there are getting 244 
the care that they need.’ (P39, practice manager, low performer, affluent 245 
area) 246 
Others, particularly practices serving more deprived populations, appeared to be 247 
directly amenable to financial reward as an extrinsic driver. 248 
‘We’re so hard up at the moment, so desperate for income wherever we 249 
can get it, you can’t afford to pass up a chance of income, so that’s 250 
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probably as much a driver…even if we didn’t necessarily buy in completely 251 
to the clinical benefit, it was worth doing to try and earn the money 252 
because we needed to.’  (P33, practice manager, high performer, deprived 253 
area) 254 
However, there were concerns that financial rewards from the scheme may not have 255 
been worth the effort involved in achieving targets and that the scheme did not 256 
directly target most of the people actually doing this additional work. 257 
‘Yes it’s more money for the practice but the majority of people in general 258 
practice are paid by the practice and they just see it’s more work for them 259 
to do, certainly our practice staff used to think of it [Local QOF] as a huge 260 
amount of work’ (P4, scheme developer)  261 
For practice managers and GPs in affluent high-performing practices, competition 262 
and implicit threats to status also emerged as motivators. 263 
‘It does feel a bit like a competition with other surgeries, I don’t know how 264 
others feel but I wouldn’t like to come last in our locality.’  (P19, practice 265 
manager, high performer, affluent area) 266 
There were three other ways in which the scheme appeared to influence clinical 267 
behaviour.  Firstly, several high-performing practices and one low-performer had 268 
adapted templates provided by the PCT to support processes of care and recording 269 
in consultations.  Practitioners from these practices considered that such prompts 270 
had been helpful. 271 
‘Before the patients come in you know that you have to do these things, so 272 
it is a motivation.  If the reminder didn’t come up, you wouldn’t remember 273 
to do those things.’ (P22, GP partner, low performer, deprived area) 274 
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Secondly, some health professionals and developers of the scheme felt that it 275 
promoted standardised care and believed that adherence to the indicators had 276 
become routine practice.  Consultation templates supported this setting of new 277 
norms within clinical routines. 278 
‘Once we start doing something, it does change your practice and you carry 279 
on. The learning disabilities, because we saw the value of it we’ve kept the 280 
template, we’re still doing the checks, so I think because we put in all that 281 
initial time and resource, actually then each year it will get less, so we’re 282 
happy to carry that on.  I think where we’ve seen that there’s clinical benefit, 283 
once you start doing it, it becomes habit.’ (P27, salaried GP, high performer, 284 
affluent area) 285 
Thirdly, the social influence of having a member of practice staff as the champion for 286 
the scheme promoted engagement.  287 
‘It’s having someone that’s responsible for it, it’s their baby, they’ve got an 288 
interest in it, and they will drive it through.  That’s what you need if you 289 
want to achieve with these things you need a champion, someone who will 290 
champion it for you.’ (P33, practice manager, high performer, affluent 291 
area) 292 
Exacerbated tensions 293 
The scheme exacerbated tensions at three levels: between patients and 294 
professionals within consultations; between doctors and nurses within practices; and 295 
between affluent and deprived population practices within the PCT. 296 
Perceived pressure to focus on targets and ‘box ticking’ during consultations both 297 
undermined professionalism and alienated patients. 298 
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‘A lot of patients know I’m ticking a box and they shouldn’t feel like that, a 299 
patient shouldn’t have to come to a surgery and then I just say, “Oh can I 300 
ask you this”, “Oh yeah you’re just ticking, ticking that box.” They shouldn’t 301 
feel like that.’  (P40, practice nurse, low performer, affluent area) 302 
This generated conflict between GP and patient agendas, which many also 303 
recognised as a consequence of the national QOF.  304 
‘It distracts from the consultation and it can leave you know feeling a bit 305 
confused and perhaps as though that, the thing that the patient regards as 306 
the problem hasn’t been addressed properly.’ (P6, scheme developer) 307 
There were also concerns about adding more and more into consultations: 308 
 ‘The consensus among a lot of the GP’s was that it moved away from 309 
being patient centred to doctor centred consultations in that we never 310 
actually got round to why the patient really had come to see us if we spent 311 
so much time on QOF.  There was a lot of discussion around running out 312 
of time and then running over, and the impact that that had on the patient, 313 
the practice and then personally. (P29, GP partner, high performer, 314 
affluent area) 315 
The scheme augmented perceptions of unfair distributions of workloads and 316 
remuneration within practices, particularly between nursing and medical staff.  Some 317 
nurses were keen to emphasize that they did not think that they should receive 318 
additional money for doing their job. 319 
‘We’re paid money to do that anyway, why is it that there’s extra money 320 
given when you’re given a wage to do it anyway?  I don’t know why a 321 
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carrot should be dangled to a health professional, personally I find it 322 
immoral.’ (P37, practice nurse, high performer, deprived area) 323 
However, several nurses were openly critical of the fact that whilst they did most of 324 
the work, it was the GPs who benefitted financially.  325 
‘I think we feel that we do a lot of work towards the QOF and we probably 326 
feel as though we ought to recompensed, if we had a bonus that was 327 
specifically because we knew that we’d hit QOF targets. I think people feel 328 
well why should only certain parts of the team get it when everybody’s 329 
worked as hard towards it?’ (P11, practice nurse, high performer, affluent 330 
area) 331 
Amongst practices serving relatively affluent and deprived populations, there was an 332 
opinion that the scheme risked widening inequalities between ‘us and them’ if 333 
universally applied, as opposed to focusing on practices and populations with most 334 
scope for improvement: 335 
‘You’ll always get this top lot that will sign up to it all, always do it, know 336 
how to do it, cause they’re whizzes.  But you’ve always got the laggards at 337 
the bottom.  They’re the ones that really need to be doing the local QOF.  338 
It really should have been targeted at those practices first.’ (P13, practice 339 
manager, high performer, affluent area) 340 
 341 
Discussion 342 
Contrary to aspirations, this local pay-for-performance scheme did not engender any 343 
distinctive sense of ownership nor avoid any of the conflicts associated with the 344 
national scheme.  The indicators were seen as reflecting national rather than 345 
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specifically locally-owned priorities; subsequent to the initiation of this scheme, three 346 
out of the five health priorities had been included in the national QOF.  Although the 347 
indicators and their evidence base were seldom actively questioned, doubts were 348 
expressed about their focus on health promotion given that eventual benefits relied 349 
upon patient action and the availability of local resources (e.g. for alcohol or weight 350 
problems). 351 
Whilst practices serving more affluent populations focused on status and patient 352 
benefit as motivators for participating in the scheme, those serving more deprived 353 
populations also highlighted financial reward.  However, the scheme appeared to 354 
influence behaviour through a range of mechanisms beyond extrinsic reward such as 355 
standardisation of patient care, practice champions and computerised prompts.  356 
Unintended consequences included the exacerbation of tensions at three levels: 357 
between patient and professional consultation agendas; between GPs seen as 358 
benefitting directly from incentives and nurses who did much of the work; and 359 
between practices serving more affluent populations where targets might be easier 360 
to achieve and those serving more deprived populations. 361 
There has been relatively little evaluation of local pay-for-performance schemes, 362 
which are likely to continue emerging in various forms [18].  We identified similar 363 
themes to qualitative studies of the national QOF scheme, including the credibility of 364 
incentivised targets, tensions within consultations, changing professional identity and 365 
roles, and inequities in the workload and remuneration balance among practice staff 366 
[5-9, 22-25].  These suggest that the local scheme was not viewed or experienced 367 
differently by targeted professionals and, taken with our findings suggesting sparse 368 
ownership, casts doubt upon the notion that such a scheme achieved greater 369 
professional ‘buy-in.’  Our findings are therefore consistent with an evaluation by 370 
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Kristensen et al of a national pay-for-performance initiative which centred on locally 371 
negotiated indicators [26].  This also found a gap between the policy intention of 372 
creating locally-owned indicators and actual experience of the initiative.  373 
Interventions aiming to improve the quality of care are often conceived and 374 
implemented based on a hopeful set of assumptions about professional behaviour 375 
and contexts [27].Like others, we found that this scheme appeared to operate in a 376 
number of ways, beyond the direct influence of financial incentives [6, 22, 28].  377 
Hence, the range of explicit and implicit behaviour change techniques associated 378 
with pay-for-performance schemes, such as social influence and competition, 379 
underline the need to conceptualise and evaluate them as complex interventions [29-380 
31].  Again, the notion of local ownership did not emerge as a strong additional driver 381 
for change in our evaluation. 382 
Our study limitations included the experiences of an intervention from the one former 383 
PCT, the characteristics of participating practices, study participants and timing, and 384 
the risk of social desirability bias.  First, this study took place in one geographical 385 
area and studied one local pay-for-performance scheme, thereby limiting 386 
generalizability to other areas and schemes. Second, although we sought a range of 387 
practice characteristics for our sample, we found that our participants under-388 
represented poorer performing practices.  This could have affected the balance of 389 
views and experiences, potentially towards an emphasis on positive experiences.  390 
However, we encountered sceptical beliefs across the range of participants, even 391 
amongst scheme developers.  Third, we examined perspectives of both those 392 
targeted by the scheme and its developers, and encountered little divergence of 393 
views.  We might have identified more differences had we been able to capture the 394 
developers’ ideas and expectations during the planning phase of the scheme.  We 395 
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were unable to identify further information on how the indicators were ‘evidenced,’ 396 
which may have influenced perceived credibility.  Fourth, we were aware that 397 
professionals interviewed might tend to express socially desirable opinions or 398 
behaviours.  This could have steered responses either way – towards being seen 399 
either to favour the scheme or critical of the PCT.  We emphasized the anonymity 400 
and confidentiality of study participation, and the interviews did not aim to judge 401 
professional performance. 402 
Potential indicators require testing for key attributes such as acceptability and 403 
feasibility before they can be rolled out nationally [32].  Glasziou and colleagues 404 
proposed nine criteria to help judge whether incentive schemes are likely to do more 405 
good than harm [33]. Three of these seem particularly relevant viewed through the 406 
lens of health professionals targeted by a local scheme: whether the desired clinical 407 
action improves patient outcomes; whether benefits clearly outweigh any unintended 408 
harmful effects, and at an acceptable cost; and whether systems and structures 409 
needed for change are in place.   410 
The Bradford and Airedale scheme’s focus on public health priorities – in contrast to 411 
the national QOF which largely focuses on clinical monitoring and treatment – 412 
illustrates some of the challenges inherent in fulfilling these criteria.  Some health 413 
professionals believed that the local preventive targets could be cost-effective in the 414 
long-term.  Others expressed uncertainty about their ‘real world’ effects, reflecting 415 
wider doubts about their roles and competencies in promoting health [34-36] and 416 
concerns that attainment depended upon patient adherence or supporting resources 417 
in the wider community.  Any perceived benefits may have been outweighed by 418 
unintended knock-on effects on a range of professional and patient relationships 419 
[25].   420 
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“Localism” is regularly recycled as a theme in NHS policy-making [37].  In order to 421 
increase clinical autonomy and therefore have maximal impact upon patient care, 422 
there are continuing calls for greater professional involvement in developing pay-for-423 
performance indicators [38].  This is order to increase professional buy-in with such 424 
schemes and ensure that indicators are developed from within and not imposed from 425 
the outside [26].  Yet it is difficult to get beyond such rhetoric in practice, particularly 426 
in generating and implementing performance targets which are perceived as locally 427 
relevant and owned.  Professionals tend to voice opinions about the need for more 428 
involvement in developing targets and their dissemination.  In reality, there are only 429 
so many consultations, working groups or educational events that they can actually 430 
participate in.  Furthermore, local groups are unlikely to have access to similar levels 431 
of resources, such as those possessed by the National Institute for Care Excellence, 432 
to derive robust, evidence-based indicators.  There is a case for further efforts to 433 
ensure that the underlying goals of performance targets are communicated to 434 
targeted professionals and aligned with professional values, especially as a means 435 
of overcoming some of the passive acceptance we found [11, 12, 22].  There is a 436 
growing and increasingly robust evidence base on interventions to change 437 
professional practice for policy-makers and quality improvement leaders to draw 438 
upon [39]. 439 
Pay-for-performance itself has a problematic evidence base, with a Cochrane 440 
Review concluding there is “insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of 441 
financial incentives to improve the quality of primary health care” [2]. Given that one 442 
of the intentions of such schemes is often to reduce inequalities in health outcomes, 443 
any future local schemes may need to recognise the greater difficulties faced by 444 
practices serving more deprived populations [40].  As well as financial reward, 445 
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suggested as a stronger motivator in such practices, the achievement of indicators 446 
may also depend upon resources already available within practices and the wider 447 
community.  Persuasion about patient benefit and social comparison were also 448 
critical levers, or implicit co-interventions.  Pay for performance represents an 449 
inherently complex intervention with variable effects according to context, the nature 450 
of the behaviours targeted, and co-interventions, all of which need to be taken into 451 
account in planning and evaluating such schemes  [28, 41]. 452 
Policy-makers should not under-estimate the difficulties faced in promoting 453 
ownership of local pay-for-performance schemes.  Incentives alone are often 454 
insufficient to bring about change; significant progress is likely to depend upon multi-455 
level approaches which launch and coordinate action across all levels of healthcare 456 
systems (individual, team, organisational and wider system) [42]. These approaches 457 
should draw upon evidence-based interventions to improve practice [39], tailored to 458 
identified barriers to change.  The costs of efforts to promote engagement with local 459 
pay-for-performance schemes need to be considered against realistic appraisals of 460 
their likely effects and alternative strategies. 461 
 462 
Conclusion 463 
We found little difference in the experience of a local pay-for-performance scheme 464 
compared to a national scheme.  Together, with the limited evidence of professional 465 
ownership, it is hard to argue that it offered distinct advantages over and above the 466 
existing national QOF scheme.  Future developments of similar schemes should 467 
study the impact of differential rewards for practices serving more and less deprived 468 
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populations, and consider a wider range of levers to promote professional 469 
understanding and ownership of indicators.   470 
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Tables 
Table 1: Indicators for the local pay-for-performance scheme 
Domain Indicator Description Number of points 
Alcohol A1 The practice can produce a register of patient aged 16 
years and over with a record of the number of units of 
alcohol consumed on a weekly basis in the past 27 
months 
10 
A2 Patients who drink equal or greater than 14 units a 
week for females and 21 units a week for males in a 7 
day cycle with a period of at least 2 days abstinence 
are offered a brief intervention 
10 
Chlamydia C1 The practice can produce a register of patients aged 15 
to 24 of both sexes 
2 
C2 Patients between 15–24 years old who have been 
offered screening by their practice and have a recorded 
test result 
£5 for every screen 
recorded  
Learning 
Disabilities 
LD1 The practice can produce a register of people over 18 
with LD 
£50 per registered 
patient 
LD2 The % of patients with LD with a review recorded in the 
preceding 15 months.  Checks include accuracy of 
prescribed medication, physical health and co-
ordination with secondary care 
£50 for every 
health check 
completed 
Weight 
Management 
OB1 Production of a register of patients between 16–75 with 
a BMI equal of greater than 25 recorded in the last 5 
years 
3 
OB2 Production of a register of patients between 16–75 with 7 
27 
 
a BMI equal of greater than 25 recorded in the last 15 
months 
OB3 Patients with a BMI equal or greater than 25 receive 
appropriate intervention in the past 15 months 
20 
Osteoporosis OST1 Production of a register of female patients aged 65–74 
with a fracture in the previous 15 months 
2 
OST2 Female patients 65–74 that have had a fracture are 
referred for a BMD scan 
4 
OST3 The practice can produce a register of male and female 
patients aged 16–74 years who have received at least 
one repeat prescription for oral prednisolone in the 
previous 6 months 
2 
OST4 The % of patients on register (OST 3) who have a 
record of a DXA scan being performed at any time or a 
referral for a DXA scan in the previous 15 months 
5 
OST5 The percentage of patients on register (OST 4) who 
have a record of a DXA scan being performed at any 
time, or a referral for a DXA scan in the previous 15 
months, or have been assessed for osteoporosis risk 
2 
OST6 The practice can produce a register of male and female 
patients aged 75 years and over who have had a 
fragility fracture of the vertebrae, hip, wrist, or humerus 
since their 75
th
 Birthday 
2 
OST7 The percentage of male and female patients aged 75 
years and over who have had a fragility fracture of the 
vertebrae, hip, wrist, or humerus since their 75
th
 
Birthday, who have been assessed and treated for 
Osteoporosis risk ever 
5 
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Table 2: Spread of practices and practice staff across performance and deprivation* 
QOF score Deprivation Level 
Deprived Affluent 
High 5 practices 
- GP Partner (3) 
- Practice Nurse (2) 
- Practice Manager (5) 
7 practices 
- Practice Manager (8) 
- GP Partner (5) 
- Practice nurse (8) 
- Salaried GP (2) 
Low 3 practices 
- Practice Manager (1) 
- GP Partner (2) 
1 practice 
- Practice nurse (1) 
- Practice Manager (1) 
*In addition, there were six other people interviewed who were involved with the 
development of the local scheme: four PCT members, one salaried GP, and one 
practice nurse. 
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Appendix 1:  
Topic guide 
Section Types of questions/prompts 
Background What is your professional background? 
 How many years have you been qualified? 
 How many sessions do you work in a usual week? 
 How would you describe your role in the practice? 
General What has your involvement been in developing the local QOF? 
What has your involvement been in implementing the local QOF 
within your practice? 
Your opinions 
Appropriateness of 
incentivised targets 
Robustness/credibility of evidence base  
Costs 
Relevance Clinical benefit 
Local population needs  
Fairness of indicators 
 
Distribution of workload 
Scope for gaming 
Implications for tackling inequalities 
Acceptability of targets Compare to national targets 
How does the local scheme work? 
How does the scheme 
influence what you do? 
Ownership of change / engagement 
Motivation (intrinsic and extrinsic) 
Social comparison, performance management and surveillance 
30 
 
 
Organisational means employed to achieve targets 
Consequences Effect on practice staff and consultations 
- Benefits and unintended consequences 
Effect on patients and patient care 
- Benefits and unintended consequences 
Change required to achieve targets 
Are you still maintaining these targets even though the scheme 
has ended? 
How could local QOF be 
modified and/or 
improved?  
How it should be introduced 
How implemented on a day to day basis in the practice 
Local versus national benefits and harms? 
Anything else that you would like to add? 
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Appendix 2: 
Coding schedule 
Deductive coding 
to areas taken from 
literature 
Inductive codes 
emerging from 
interviews 
Iterative refining of deductive and inductive 
codes and themes 
Final themes 
Influences on behaviour: Motivation: 
Patient benefit 
 
Practitioner 
motivation: 
Financial reward 
Patient benefit 
Competition with other 
practices 
Influences on 
behaviour Ownership of change 
Motivation (intrinsic 
and extrinsic) 
Social comparison 
Organisational means 
Support among 
practices  
Financial reward 
Relevance: Opinions: 
Don’t agree with 
localisation 
Lack of 
knowledge/interest in 
evidence  
 
Attitudes towards the 
scheme: 
Role of general 
practice 
Acceptance/rejection 
of an externally 
defined way of working  
Faith in the evidence 
Clinical benefit 
Local population 
needs 
Clinical value 
Credibility 
Prevalence 
Fairness: 
Distribution of 
workload 
Scope for gaming 
Implications for 
tackling inequalities 
Uneven workload 
Minimal change 
The bigger picture 
Failed to address 
inequalities 
Adjusting role of 
general practice 
Appropriateness of incentivised targets: Credibility: 
Other guidelines 
Clinical value 
Conflict 
with/supported by 
prevalence in 
population 
Credibility of 
the locally 
negotiated 
indicators 
Robustness of 
evidence base 
Costs 
 
Conflict with 
professional identity 
Conflict among 
practice staff 
Conflict with patient 
benefit 
Funding improves 
credibility 
Acceptability: Effect on 
professionals: 
Created an uneven 
workload 
 
Effect on patients: 
Standardised care 
 
Effect on 
consultations: 
Adapt templates as 
aids 
Embedded behaviour 
Required minimal 
change 
Effects of 
implementing a local 
scheme: 
Allowed local issues to 
be addressed 
Caused inequalities 
Exacerbating 
tensions Compare to national 
QOF 
Just another income 
stream 
Conflicting credibility 
with NQOF 
Consequences: 
Effect on practice 
staff  
Effect on patients 
and patient care 
Adapt consultations 
Impact on patient 
experience 
Time pressure 
Conflicting agendas 
Distracting in 
consultations 
Embedded behaviour  
Standardised care 
Consultation 
consequences 
Target became routine 
practice 
Recommendations: Recommendations: 
LoQOF champion 
Patient involvement 
Bottom up approach 
Based at cluster level 
Outside support 
Protected learning 
time for all staff 
Data support 
Experience of 
engagement: 
Highlight available 
external support for 
data extraction and 
management 
Familiarisation period 
before data collection 
Ownership 
How it should be 
introduced 
Local versus national 
benefits and harms 
Evolving assessment 
process 
Extension of NQOF 
Conflict with NQOF  
Bottom up approach 
Setup time 
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